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I. INTRODUCTION
1

In Hagen v. Burmeister & Associates, Inc., the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered for the first time the issue of employer
vicarious liability for an employee’s violation of the Minnesota
2
Uniform Trade Secret Act (MUTSA). The underlying issue of

† Ms. Dobash is Vice President and Senior Counsel with Taro
Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Taro Pharmaceuticals.
1. 633 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 2001).
2. M INN. STAT. § 325C.01-325C.07 (2001).
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theft of another person’s property is rooted in antiquity and
certainly predates our modern judicial systems. The doctrine of
employer vicarious liability evolved more recently but is now
embedded in the American tort system.
The perils of piracy, plunder, theft and robbery have impeded
3
commerce for centuries and have produced a variety of questions
4
in every system of jurisprudence. The Rhodians reduced maritime
law into a code in order to apply principles of justice to the risks of
navigation and commerce, and the Romans subsequently preserved
5
or reformed these laws. As commerce recovered from its decline
in the dark ages, the laws began to again address commercial
concerns in order to foster this activity. Many claimed to be the first
to establish a theory of mutual rights of traders and to secure
6
redress of commercial injuries.
Protection of trade secret
commercial property was somewhat slower to emerge than
protections for other commercial property due to the intangible
7
nature of the subject matter. In the United States, trade secret law
began to emerge in the 1800s. In its 1868 opinion of Peabody v.
8
Norfolk, which shaped United States trade secret law, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated, “[i]t is the policy of
the law, for the advantage of the public, to encourage and protect
9
invention and commercial enterprise.”
Fast-forward to the present, the age of technology, a freewheeling era in which information, innovative ideas, computer
3. See 3 HENRY HALLAM, HISTORY OF EUROPE DURING THE M IDDLE AGES 44-45
(1899) (describing obstacles to trade in the Middle Ages).
4. Id. at 61; Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search
of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 251 n.54 (1998) (stating that “secrets might
have received some protection in Roman law, although the matter is open to some
dispute”) (citing A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi
Corrupti, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1930)).
5. See HALLAM, supra note 3, at 61.
6. Id. at 51-52 (discussing how the occupation of merchant became more
honorable and placed on footing with landed proprietors and describing how
commerce became leading subject of English statutes from accession of Edward
III); id. at 45 (“Robbery, indeed, is the constant theme both of the Capitularies
and of the Anglo-Saxon laws; one has more reason to wonder at the intrepid thirst
for lucre, which induced a very few merchants to exchange the products of
different regions, than to ask why no general spirit of commercial activity
prevailed.”); id. at 62-63 (discussing early codes and regulations, including Il
Consolato del Mare).
7. Bone, supra note 4, at 252.
8. 98 Mass. 452 (1868).
9. Id. at 457; Bone, supra note 4, at 252 (discussing Peabody v. Norfolk, 98
Mass. 452 (1868) and history of trade secret law).
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code and other intangibles can be a company’s most valuable
10
assets.
Novel technologies, innovation, internet and other
communication advances have expanded the world’s horizons,
sparked ground-breaking commercial opportunities and created a
11
whole new breed of industrial competition. Rather than raiding
cargo and freight, competitors and others ransack companies for
blueprints, software code, formulations, research and development,
12
plans, ideas, information and data. Corporate espionage is a
common and costly hazard, with the theft of trade secrets and
other intellectual property rights in the United States costing
13
companies billions of dollars. Service industries have sprung to
10. Bone, supra note 4, at 243.
11. See Raytheon Co. Settles Corporate Spy Case with AGES Group, WALL ST. J., May
13, 1999, at A18 (reporting Raytheon’s settlement regarding alleged corporate
espionage in an unsuccessful attempt to undermine competitor’s bid for $450
million contract to service U.S. military aircraft). According to David Forbes,
chairman of Quo Vadis International, a Denver-based security consulting
company:
A big reason corporate spying has increased recently is that
competition among businesses has gotten fiercer. As American society
in general has become more aggressive, even hostile, and less tolerant,
those behaviors have extended to businesses, as well . . . . You can’t
separate the way people see society and politics from the way they see
the conduct of a corporation.
Paula Moore, Workplace Violence Not Worst Threat, DENV. BUS. J., Aug. 24, 2001, at
3A.
12. See Company News: Medinol Accuses Boston Scientific of Theft and Fraud, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at C4 (reporting Medinol Ltd.’s accusations that competitor
Boston Scientific Corporation stole technology for stents used in artery-clearing
angioplasties); Paul Elias, Prosecutors Stumble in Efforts to Battle Biotech Espionage,
ASSOC. PRESS NEWSWIRE, August 5, 2002 (reporting various trade secret smuggling
cases, including lab employees stealing vials of biological materials, Alzheimer’s
disease research, nuclear weapons data, and newly discovered genes); Andrew
Harris, Missouri Jury Awards $118 Million, NAT’ L L.J., Mar. 25, 2002, at A25
(reporting finding against Hartford Life Ins. Co. for theft of method of managing
corporate life insurance investments); Technology Briefing Software: Avant Executives
Sentenced, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2001, at C4 (reporting sentencing of six executives of
Avant Corporation for stealing source code for routing from software rival
Cadence Design Systems).
13. See Lilli Hsieh et al., Intellectual Property Crimes, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899,
900 (1998); Darren S. Tucker, The Federal Government’s War on Economic Espionage,
18 U. PA. J. INT’ L ECON. L. 1109, 1119-21 (1997) (stating that according to 1998
National Institute of Justice study, 48% of high-tech companies have been victim
of trade secrets theft and describing estimated U.S. corporate trade secret loss
estimates as $2 billion to $260 billion, and $400 billion if overseas operations are
included, along with one to six million lost jobs); Neil King Jr. & Jess Bravin, Call It
Mission Impossible Inc.—Corporate-Spying Firms Thrive, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2000, at B1
(citing PriceWaterhouseCoopers study showing theft of proprietary information
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life, specializing in both performing “competitive intelligence”
14
15
services and in combating industrial espionage. Our federal and
state governments have also responded by adapting existing laws
and remedies to the changing situations and enacting fresh
legislation targeted at theft of trade secrets and other intellectual
16
property.
Companies are especially vulnerable to theft of trade secrets by
17
former employees. According to one expert, ninety percent of

cost Fortune 1000 companies $45 billion in 1999); Elias, supra note 12 (reporting
allegedly that stolen vials of biological “glue” used in stem cell experiments worth
$1 billion “in the right hands”); Riva Richmond, Rising Layoffs Are a Boon to Internet
Security Firms, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2001, at B11F (“The CSI/FBI survey showed 186
companies lost $377.8 million from computer crime in the past year. Financial
fraud and data theft, both of which typically involve insiders, accounted for 65% of
those losses.”).
14. Harry Wingo, Note, Dumpster Diving and the Ethical Blindspot of Trade Secret
Law, 16 YALE L. & POL’ Y REV. 195, 215 (1997) (noting that [c]ompetitive
intelligence has become so common place [sic] that it is considered an industry
complete with its own professional association—the Society of Competitive
Intelligence Professionals (SCIP)”); Competition Drives Industrial Spying; Espionage:
Some Companies May Skirt Ethics, Laws to Keep an Eye on Their Rivals, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2001, at C3 (describing market intelligence and corporate espionage services).
The intelligence industry stresses the difference between “competitive
intelligence” and “industrial espionage”; according the Society of Competitive
Intelligence Professionals, “[c]ompetitive intelligence is the legal and ethical
collection and analysis of information about the competitive environment . . . .
Corporate espionage implies the theft of trade secrets, which is both illegal and
unethical.” Id. According to Kroll Inc., “[t]he market for business intelligence is
worth about $2 billion a year worldwide, including services ranging from detective
work to clipping news articles.” Id.
15. See, e.g., Richmond, supra note 13 (describing internet security firms’
booming business resulting from massive layoffs in computer industry); King &
Bravin, supra note 13, at B1 (discussing “competitive intelligence” subindustry);
American Society for Industrial Security, Educational Sessions, SEC. MGMT., July 1,
2002, at 96 (listing numerous corporate security consultants and seminars
regarding industrial security, including protection of trade secrets).
16. See generally Hsieh, supra note 13 (analyzing various intellectual property
crime concepts and legislation, including Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
National Stolen Property Act of 1934, Uniform Trade Secrets Act (amended
1985), mail and wire fraud statutes, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act of 1994 (RICO), Trademark Counterfeiting Act, Copyright
Felony Act of 1984, and the Database Protection Bill of 1998-99 (not passed into
law).
17. See Bone, supra note 4, at 244 (stating that majority of trade secret cases
involve disloyal employees) (citing 1 Roger M. Milgrim, M ILGRIM ON TRADE
SECRETS § 5.02[1] (1996)); Ex-Lucent Scientists Indicted for Plotting Theft of Trade
Secrets, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2001, at B8 (reporting charges against two former
research scientists at Lucent Technologies Inc. for conspiracy to steal Lucent trade
secrets for use in their own business); Richmond, supra note 13, at B11F.
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trade secret theft and other corporate crime involves a senior
18
employee.
Not only do many employees have access to a
company’s trade secrets and the ability to easily copy and transmit
them, but employees are more educated, mobile and change jobs
19
much more often today.
Increased relocations, mergers,
acquisitions, restructurings, layoffs and firings have also
contributed to loss of job security, as well as to “layoff rage,” which
often results in a corresponding loss of sense of loyalty to the
20
21
former employer. Greed also motivates trade secret theft. As a
result, employees have increased opportunities and motivation to
18. Moore, supra note 11, at 3A (quoting Bruce Wimmer, head of Pinkerton
Consulting & Investigations security services company). According to Wimmer:
[M]any companies don’t realize, or they deny, how exposed they are to
thieves who are on the payroll. One reason for that, and why internal
crime can be so successful, is that senior company people who have
access to the most valuable information and products are often
involved . . . . And that’s hard for the company to admit because it
trusts senior staff. It can’t not trust them.
Id.
19. Peter J.G. Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Under Federal Law, 22 PEPP.
L. REV. 59, 60 (1994); see also, Tucker, supra note 13, at 1114 (discussing ease of
stealing intangible property, increased employee access to trade secrets, greater
opportunities to gain knowledge of trade secrets through changing jobs, and
advances in communications); Erin M. Davis, Comment, The Doctrine of Respondeat
Superior: An Application to Employers’ Liability for the Computer or Internet Crimes
Committed by Their Employees, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 683, 688 (2002) (observing
that “computer technology in the workplace creates a unique opportunity for
employees to engage in activities that are contrary to their employer’s interests
and business goals”); Mark Ishman, Comment, Computer Crimes and the Respondeat
Superior Doctrine: Employers Beware, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 6, ¶ 6 (2000)
(describing ease of emailing documents, business strategies and other
information); Stephen Labaton, Downturn and Shift in Population Feed Boom in
White-Collar Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002, at A1 (discussing increased education
level of society as reason for increase in trade secret theft, fraud and white collar
crime over other crime: “The take is better and the punishment is generally less”);
Moore, supra note 11, at 3A.
20. Toren, supra note 19, at 61 n.7; Richmond, supra note 13, at B11F
(describing former employees’ acts of revenge, including theft of trade secrets and
quoting internet security expert: “Golden parachutes and promises of
recommendations that companies often barter for graceful exits—and swift escorts
to the door—aren’t always enough . . . . ‘We’re seeing what former employees are
trying to do right after they’ve signed the release and collected the severance.’”)
(quoting Tom Noonan, Chief Executive, Internet Security Systems).
21. Ted Brindis & Dennis K. Berman, Three Charged in Lucent Software Theft—
Suspects Allegedly Planned to Sell Internet Data Software for Voice Data in China, WALL ST.
J., May 4, 2001, at A3 (describing Lucent employees’ formation of their own
company, joint venture with Chinese telecom, and theft of Lucent’s PathStar
system software blueprints, worth “hundreds of millions” of dollars, in hopes of
becoming “Cisco of China”).
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take, disclose or use their former employers’ trade secrets and
confidential or proprietary information.
In some cases, the new employer is involved in or aware of the
employee’s misappropriation of the former employer’s
22
information, or later ratifies the employee’s misconduct, giving
rise to a host of liabilities that are not the subject of this article.
However, in many other instances, the new employer is unaware of
the employee’s misconduct and may have explicitly prohibited such
activity. Even in cases in which the new employer did not
intentionally engage in, promote, or even know about, the theft or
use of the former employer’s trade secrets, the new employer might
still be held liable for the employee’s actions under various theories
of recovery, including the common law theory of respondeat
23
superior or vicarious liability.
Masters have long been held responsible for their servants’
24
actions, even those actions the master has forbidden. In early
22. Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., 355 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (quoting Hale v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. Ct. App.3d 681, 692-93 (1974)).
Anything which convincingly shows the intention of the principal to
adopt or approve the act in question is sufficient. It may also be shown
by implication . . . “where an agent is authorized to do an act, and he
transcends his authority, it is the duty of the principal to repudiate the
act as soon as he is fully informed of what has been thus done in his
name . . . else he will be bound by the act as having ratified it by
implication.”
Id.
23. See Joel M. Androphy et al., General Corporate Criminal Liability, 60 TEX . B.J.
121, 126-28 (1997) (stating that employer may be held liable even if employee
acted contrary to corporate policy or instructions); John E. Davidson, Reconciling
the Tension Between Employer Liability and Employer Privacy, 8 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS.
L.J., 145, 180 (1998) (recognizing trend to hold innocent employer liable for
employee’s wrongful activities).
24. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 348 (1891); see
also Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal
Science: From Hale To Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 463 (1996) (noting
“incorporation into the common law of the doctrine of the vicarious liability of
employers for harm caused by negligent acts of their servants (respondeat
superior)”).
This development was also a contribution of Lord Holt, who imported
it into the common law chiefly from maritime law, which was then
understood as part of the law of nations. See Boson v. Sandford, 91 Eng.
Rep. 382 (1691), a maritime case brought by owners of cargo against
the owners of a ship for damage done to the cargo while it was under
the supervision of the ship’s master. The owners of the ship disavowed
liability, because they had not personally undertaken to ship the goods,
but Lord Holt held that ‘whoever employs another is answerable for
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times, the family or mercantile household included servants, often
chosen when young and remaining until death. In this context, the
household or business was regarded as a unit, and the act of any
25
member of the unit was the responsibility of its head. From its
Roman origins to the early English incarnations, the theory of
respondeat superior, meaning literally “let the superior reply,” was
typically invoked to hold the master responsible only for those acts
of his servant that were commanded by him, or that were
negligently performed by the servant in furtherance of the master’s
26
endeavors. However, around 1700, the English common law
expanded the legal theory of vicarious liability for the unauthorized
and even forbidden acts of the servant as they were incidental to, or
27
foreseeable in light of, the nature of the servant’s work. This

him, and undertakes for his care to all that make use of him.’
Id. at 463 n.50. Similarly, countries have been held responsible for their citizen’s
unlawful acts. Under the laws of Marseilles and other jurisdictions if a foreign
citizen stole from a citizen of that jurisdiction, the thief’s government and its other
citizens were held responsible for the theft. See HALLAM, supra note 3, at 63-64.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958) (discussing
history of agency law).
26. Laura L. Hirschfeld, Legal Drugs? Not Without Legal Reform: The Impact of
Drug Legalization on Employers Under Current Theories of Enterprise Liability, 7 CORNELL
J. L. & PUB. POL’ Y 757, 760 (1998); see also id. at 780 n.70 (citing Holmes, supra
note 24, at 355 (finding a basis for the concept of respondeat superior in English
law as far back as the Norman Conquest)); John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 335 (1894) (observing “[w]e are safe
in concluding that by the end of the 1200s . . . the master could pretty generally
exonerate himself by pleading that he had not commanded or consented to the
act . . . .”) (citation omitted).
27. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious
Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1746 (1996) (describing series of opinions, mostly
by Justice Holt, that adopted vicarious liability and noting that none of these cases
involved personal injury) (citing Boson v. Sandford, 87 Eng. Rep. 212 (1689);
Hern v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1709); Lane v. Cotton, 88 Eng. Rep. 853
(1701); Jones v. Hart, 91 Eng. Rep. 382 (1698); Turberville v. Stampe, 91 Eng.
Rep. 1072 (1697)). Professor Schwartz continues to describe the doctrine’s rocky
start:
In any event, employer vicarious liability, having been accepted in
England in the early 1700s, was then accepted by American courts in
the early 1800s. Still, there were some hesitations. For example, the
doctrine was rejected, at least at first, in New Hampshire. Also, when
courts faced the issue of the employer’s vicarious liability to an injured
employee, the courts, in adopting the fellow-servant rule, gave the
vicarious liability doctrine a distinctly narrow interpretation.
Furthermore, over time a number of leading American analysts
expressed doubts about vicarious liability.
Id. at 1746-47 (citations omitted).
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development caused great apprehension among English scholars
and jurists since there was little precedent in English, Roman, or
even Germanic law for imposing liability on one who had no legal
or moral fault in the action. But the rationale that the master and
28
servant were “one person” prevailed.
The twentieth century ushered in new approaches to vicarious
liability law that were based primarily on economic policies that
many scholars have questioned and that some have characterized as
grounded in nineteenth century socialist and communist
29
philosophies, reliance on dicta and misinterpretations of
28. See Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 781 n.72 (citing Holmes, supra note 24, at
350 (arguing that this particular justification arose from the imposition of liability
on the head of the household for the acts of a slave or wife, both of which were
considered possessions, or chattels, of the master, and not free persons)); see also
Wigmore, supra note 26, at 317 (stating “[t]he doer of a deed was responsible
whether he acted innocently or inadvertently, because he was the doer . . . the
owner of an animal, the master of a slave, was responsible because he was
associated with it as owner, as master.”).
29. See Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 785; see also id. at 785-90 (discussing
evolution of “deep pocket” or “long purse” justification for vicarious liability and
its socialistic roots and criticizing disregard of precedent). Professor Hirschfeld
observes the notion that because the employer can pay, the employer should pay,
has trumped all other justifications according to the socialist theories that underlie
the twentieth century American law of vicarious liability. Id. at 790. Hirschfeld
examines the socialistic rhetoric of, among others, Professor Warren Seavey:
[A]lthough it is in conformity with the spirit of our times to believe
that if one is successful enough either to operate a business or to
employ servants, in addition to the income taxes taking off the upper
layers of soft living, he should pay for the misfortunes caused others by
his business or household. This, of itself, may not be a sufficiently
strong reason. . . . . To-day, however, we realize that the loss from
accident usually falls upon the community as a whole . . . . The business
enterprise, until it becomes insolvent, can shift losses imposed upon it
because of harm to third persons to the consumers who ultimately
pay . . . . It is this which is leading to the extension of absolute liability.
Id. at 790 (quoting Warren A. Seavey, Speculations as to “Respondeat Superior,” in
HAR. LEGAL ESSAYS 433 (1934)). Furthermore, “Professor Laski grounded his . . .
justifications for respondeat superior in the popular socialist philosophy of his day,
proclaiming a ‘social interpretation of negligence’ and a ‘frankly communal
application of the law,’ with the ‘promotion of social solidarity’ as its end.” Id. at
786 (citing Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 112
(1916)). Professor Laski also stated:
[T]he employer is himself no more a public servant . . . . If that
employer is himself compelled to bear the burden of his servant’s torts
even when he himself is personally without fault, it is because in a
social distribution of profit and loss, the balance of least disturbance
seems thereby best obtained.
Id. at 787-88 (citing Laski, supra, at 112).
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30

precedent.
Despite the fact that the Industrial Revolution
shattered the old master-servant model and introduced the modern
31
concept of “employment,” the vicarious liability doctrine is alive
and well today, albeit with updated justifications discussed in
further detail below.
Minnesota and other jurisdictions have previously considered
32
employer liability for its employee’s theft of trade secrets, but in
30. See Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 788 n.109 (citing Professor Thomas Baty);
Rhett B. Franklin, Comment, Pouring New Wine into an Old Bottle: A Recommendation
for Determining Liability of an Employer Under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. L. REV. 570,
574 n.34 (1994) (stating that modern phase of the doctrine of respondeat
superior stems from the dicta of Lord Holt). Professor Hirschfeld stated:
In his book entitled Vicarious Liability, Professor Thomas Baty argues
that the two English cases most often cited for the origin of the
“modern” notion of respondeat superior—Turberville v. Stampe, 91 Eng.
Rep. 1072 (1697), and Hern v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1709)—were
misinterpreted. THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 21-22 (1916). Baty
maintains that Turberville v. Stampe was not a respondeat superior case
at all, but a case of absolute liability—the non-delegable duty to safely
maintain the use of fire on one’s premises. See id. at 19-20. He also
points out that Hern v. Nichols sounded not in tort, but in contract, and
that the buyer of nonconforming goods in that case would have had
recourse against the seller in any event. See id. at 11-12. Baty insists
that later judges relied not upon the actual principles of law in those
cases, but upon Lord Holt’s dicta: “These two cases of contract and of
absolute public duty are irrelevant . . . . What one would like to know is
the precise process by which Holt’s dicta acquired the force of law
between, say, 1698 and 1725.” Id. at 28. Having established that to his
satisfaction, Baty concludes that respondeat superior is “a principle
dubious in origin and unjust in operation . . . “ and that “it will, I think,
be clear to most students that the doctrine of the employer’s
responsibility was due to no considered theory of civil liability, and to
no survival of early mediaeval notions, but was derived from an
inconsiderate use of precedents and a blind reliance on the slightest
word of an eminent judge.” Id. at 29. Evidently it was not as clear to
everyone else as it was to Baty, and he ultimately lost the argument—at
least for the time being.
Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 788 n.109.
31. See Richard R. Carlson, Why The Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees
One and How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 303-04
(2001) (discussing Blackstone’s commentaries on master-servant relationship,
evolution of employment relationship and Industrial Revolution) (citing
M ATTHEW W. FINKEN ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 3-10
(2d ed. 1996)); Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 781.
32. See, e.g., Kasner v. Gage, 281 Minn. 149, 149, 161 N.W.2d 40, 41 (1968)
(considering vicarious liability claim for agent’s misappropriation of competitor’s
business records); Newport News Indus. v. Dynamic Testing, Inc., 130 F. Supp.2d
745, 753-54 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that under Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, new employer could be liable for employee’s wrongful disclosure of former
employer’s trade secrets under theory of respondeat superior); Cont’l Data Sys.,
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33

Hagen v. Burmeister & Associates, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme
Court evaluated for the first time vicarious liability for violation of
the Minnesota Uniform Trade Secret Act. This article discusses the
evolution of the two bodies of law, misappropriation of trade
secrets and vicarious liability involved in Hagen, and how the
Minnesota Supreme Court approached these issues.
II. CIVIL MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS
A. Introduction
Trade secrets and other information have become very
valuable assets, and many businesses attempt to protect their
confidential information by requiring employees, business partners
and other third parties to sign nondisclosure and non-competition
agreements. The beauty of the nondisclosure agreement lies in the
fact that the parties define the information covered and agree on
34
the restrictions on use and disclosure of this information.
Similarly, the parties agree on the time, scope and geographical
restrictions in a non-competition agreement. If the receiving party
breaches its obligations under the confidentiality or noncompetition agreement, the disclosing party has a breach of
contract claim. Many commentators believe that these types of
agreements protect trade secrets far better than the common law of
35
trade secrets.
Prior to 1860, breach of contract—assuming a contract
existed—was the only basis of recovery for wrongful use or
36
disclosure of secret information. “Trade secret law” is distinct
Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F.Supp. 432, 442-43 (E.D.Pa. 1986) (considering in
vicarious liability action whether software program misappropriated by former
employee constituted protectable trade secret); Chanay v. Chittenden, 563 P.2d
287, 294 (Ariz. 1977) (observing possibility of new employer’s liability for new
secretary’s misappropriation of former employer’s trade secrets if committed in
the course of employment).
33. 633 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. 2001).
34. However, courts may not always enforce such agreements according to
their terms. Bone, supra note 4, at 244.
35. Patrick Garry, The Relationship between Employment Agreements and Trade
Secret Litigation in Minnesota: The Evolution of Trade Secret Law from Cherne to ElectroCraft, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 501, 525 (1985); Bone, supra note 4, at 301-02.
36. Bone, supra note 4, at 251-52.
Prior to 1860, courts simply dealt with specific legal issues in the course
of deciding suits involving express agreements not to use or disclose
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37

from contract law. Simply put, trade secret law recognizes that
regardless of whether a confidentiality agreement exists, certain
information that rises to the level of “trade secrets” is property and
38
theft of that property may result in civil (or criminal) liability.
However, the burden of proving the elements of a trade secret
claim is much higher than enforcing a valid confidentiality or noncompete agreement. This section deals with the tort of trade secret
theft, rather than contract law, as it applies to trade secrets.
Trade secret law evolved as an embodiment of natural
39
principals of property. The public policies underlying trade
secret laws today are: (1) the maintenance of commercial morality;
(2) the encouragement of invention and innovation; and (3) the
protection of the fundamental right of privacy of the trade secret
40
owner.
Generally, two elements must be satisfied in order to establish
a trade secret infringement claim: (1) the information qualifies as a
“trade secret,” and (2) the defendant wrongfully obtained, used or
disclosed the information—whether by breach of confidence, theft,
41
bribery, misrepresentation or other improper means. Courts have
long struggled with determining whether a certain piece of
information qualifies as a trade secret or should be treated as a

secret information. These issues included whether courts of equity had
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief (they did), and whether
agreements not to use or disclose were void as unlawful restraints on
trade (they were not). All these issues were decided on the basis of
established legal principles, though they were decided with some
difficulty due to the intangible nature of the new subject matter. No
court tried to expound a general theory, but by the middle of the
nineteenth century, there were enough suggestions in the opinions for
a general theory to emerge.
Id. (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 244.
38. See id. at 245.
39. Id. at 253-54 (describing evolution of trade secret law). The development
of trade secret law and its historical rationales are not the topic of this article, as
they are covered in excellent detail elsewhere. See id. at 252-60.
40. 1 M ELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1.05, at 1-15 (1997); see also Bone,
supra note 4, at 261-83 (analyzing various policy arguments for trade secret law,
including increasing incentives to create and reducing the level of private
investment in discovering and protecting secrets as well as the transactions costs
associated with value-enhancing transfers); Tucker, supra note 13, at 1121
(describing reduction in incentives for innovative behavior as effect of economic
espionage).
41. Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701 (Minn.
1982).
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42

matter of general knowledge. Both the Restatement of Torts and
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act emerged to provide uniform
guidelines for determining protectable trade secret status. The
43
First Restatement of Torts reduced the conflicting and unwieldy
body of precedent down to a fairly clear definition and set of
44
45
liability rules. Later the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”)
emerged, and several states, including Minnesota, enacted their
versions of this act. Minnesota adopted its version of the UTSA on
46
August 1, 1980. Minnesota was the first state to do so, but others
47
soon followed. Most recently, the American Law Institute’s Third
Restatement of Unfair Competition has jumped into the fray and
48
attempted to codify trade secret doctrine.
B. Minnesota Trade Secret Law Before the Minnesota Uniform Trade
Secrets Act
The common law of trade secrets in Minnesota prior to
adoption of the Minnesota Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“MUTSA”)
was defined primarily by two cases, Cherne Industrial, Inc. v. Grounds
49
50
& Associates, Inc. and Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Systems. In
Cherne, the Minnesota Supreme Court developed a definition of
“trade secret,” basically adopting the four-part test of the
Restatement of Torts section 757. To be a trade secret the
information must: (1) not be generally known or readily
ascertainable; (2) provide a competitive advantage; (3) have been
developed at plaintiff’s expense; and (4) be the subject of plaintiff’s
51
intent to keep it confidential.
42. Alois Valerian Gross, Annotation, What is “Trade Secret” so as to Render
Actionable Under State Law Its Use or Disclosure by Former Employee, 59 A.L.R.4th 641 §
2(a) (1988).
43. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1939).
44. Bone, supra note 4, at 247.
45. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws drafted the Act, and the
American Bar Association approved it in 1979. Bone, supra note 4, at 247 n.18.
46. M INN. STAT. §§ 325C.01-.08 (2001).
47. See M INN. STAT. ANN. § 325C, Refs & Annos (2002 Electronic Update)
(indicating that Louisiana, Kansas, Arkansas, Washington, Idaho, Delaware and
Indiana adopted versions in the following 2 years, with a total of 44 jurisdictions
having adopted UTSA in 2002).
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995).
49. 278 N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979).
50. 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
51. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Minn.
1979). The Cherne court used this same definition to determine what constituted
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In Jostens, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied a three-part
test for establishing a cause of action for misappropriation of a
trade secret: (1) a trade secret must exist based on the Cherne test;
(2) the defendant must have acquired the information as a result of
a confidential relationship; and (3) the defendant must have used
52
or disclosed the trade secret. In Jostens, the court found that the
system at issue failed to meet two of the four requirements of the
Cherne test for a trade secret: the system was readily ascertainable
because it was not novel, and the plaintiff did not show an intent to
53
keep the system secret.
C. The Minnesota Legal Landscape After Adoption of the Minnesota
Uniform Trade Secrets Act
As stated above, in 1980, Minnesota adopted the MUTSA,
which is basically similar to the Cherne and Jostens tests. Among
54
other things, the MUTSA provided statutory definitions for “trade
55
56
57
secret,” “misappropriation” and “improper means.”
“confidential information” for purposes of the plaintiff’s contract claim. Id. at 8990.
52. Jostens, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701-02 (Minn. 1982)
(citing three-prong test in Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v. West, 281 Minn. 13, 18, 160
N.W.2d. 566, 570 (1968)).
53. Id. at 698-701.
54. The MUTSA also provides for money damages, injunctive relief, punitive
damages and attorneys’ fee in certain cases. M INN. STAT. §§ 325C.02-325C.04
(2001).
55. M INN. STAT. § 325C.01 subd. 5 (2001).
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable
by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
The existence of a trade secret is not negated merely because an
employee or other person has acquired the trade secret without
express or specific notice that it is a trade secret if, under all the
circumstances, the employee or other person knows or has reason to
know that the owner intends or expects the secrecy of the type of
information comprising the trade secret to be maintained.
Id.
56. M INN. STAT. § 325C.01 subd. 3 (2001).
“Misappropriation” means:
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The MUTSA was intended to carry forward, explain and clarify
the existing Minnesota common law, not replace it. The MUTSA
itself states that it displaces conflicting Minnesota law by providing
58
civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret. The act
further explicitly states that it does not affect “(1) contractual
remedies whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade
secret; (2) other civil remedies that are not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret; or (3) criminal remedies,
59
whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.”
In 1983, in Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., the
Minnesota Supreme Court applied the MUTSA to a case involving
allegations that former employees of the plaintiff, a specialized
motor manufacturer, misappropriated the plaintiff’s trade secrets
for use in starting up their own company to compete with the
60
plaintiff. All of the accused employees had signed confidentiality
agreements when they were hired, but not non-compete
61
agreements.
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or
has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper
means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade
secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know
that the discloser’s or user’s knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized
improper means to acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of the discloser’s or user’s position,
knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that
knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake.
Id.
57. M INN. STAT. § 325C.01 subd. 2 (2001). “‘Improper means’ includes theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.” Id.
58. M INN. STAT. § 325C.07(a).
59. M INN. STAT. § 325C.07(b).
60. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 893-96
(Minn. 1983).
61. Id. at 895.
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The Electro-Craft court emphasized that the existing common
law regarding trade secret misappropriation still applied, except to
62
the extent it was modified by the MUTSA. In order to establish a
claim, the plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a “trade secret,”
63
and (2) “misappropriation” of that trade secret. This is basically
the Jostens test with the second and third elements (wrongful
acquisition and use/disclosure) combined and enhanced.
The court first considered whether a trade secret existed. It
looked to the MUTSA definition and broke it down into three
mandatory components: (1) whether the information was not
generally known to and not readily ascertainable by proper means
by other persons; (2) whether the information had some
independent economic value; and (3) whether reasonable efforts
64
had been made to maintain its secrecy. The Electro-Craft court
found that the first two requirements of the “trade secret”
65
definition were present, but that the plaintiff failed to establish
66
the third requirement, secrecy.
The court provided guidance with respect to each of these
components of the MUTSA trade secret definition. First, the
system satisfied the “not generally known or readily ascertainable”
requirement because it was a unique combination of features that
67
could not be readily reverse engineered. The complexity and
68
detail of the data affected ascertainability. Also, novelty is not a
requirement to the same extent as it is with patents, but some
69
novelty is required. The court noted that the law of trade secrets
70
does not protect talent or expertise, only secret information.
Next, the court interpreted the “independent economic value”
requirement as analogous to the common law “competitive
71
advantage” requirement. The court observed that this does not
require that the owner of the trade secret be the only one in the
market because several developers of the same information, for
72
example, may have trade secrets in that information. Rather, this
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 898.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 899-901.
Id.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 899.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 900.
Id.
Id.
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component can be satisfied by a showing that an outsider would
73
gain a valuable share of the market by obtaining that information.
This element can also be established by evidence that the owner
would lose value if the outsider, armed with the owner’s
information, could enter the market—thereby cutting into the
owner’s market share—“without a substantial development
74
expense.”
Last, the court explained that a showing of actual, continuing
efforts to maintain secrecy, not just intent, is essential to satisfy the
75
secrecy component. It relied heavily on existing common law in
its analysis and emphasized that it is critical that the owner itself
continuously treated the information as confidential and that the
owner informed its employees in no uncertain terms that the
76
information at issue was secret and should not be disclosed. The
court considered the owner’s physical security measures (efforts to
protect information from discovery by outsiders, such as use of
guards, locks, filing practices, disposal practices, etc.) and
confidentiality procedures (efforts to inform employees and others
of confidential nature of information, such as confidentiality
notifications to employees and third parties, policies,
confidentiality markings on documents, access, etc.) but noted that
77
the level of measures required would vary on a case by case basis.
The court concluded that the owner’s relaxed physical security
measures and confidentiality measures failed to demonstrate any
78
effort to maintain secrecy, and therefore the information could
79
not be considered a trade secret.
The Electro-Craft court also considered the “misappropriation”
requirement even though the court was not required to reach this

73. Id.
74. Id. at 900-01.
75. Id. at 901.
76. Id. at 901-02.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 901-03. The court noted that some entrances were unlocked, the
badge system had been abandoned, discarded drawings and plans for the motors
were simply thrown away rather than destroyed, motor drawings were not kept in a
central or locked location, none of the technical documents were marked
“confidential” and drawings and other confidential information were sent to
customers and vendors without special marking, the owner never issued a policy
regarding what it considered confidential, and the public had been invited to
observe the manufacturing process during an “open house.” Id. at 902-03.
79. Id. at 902.
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80

issue. Under the MUTSA, misappropriation requires some
showing that the acquisition, disclosure or use of the information
81
occurred through improper means. In the employment context,
82
this can be established by showing a duty to maintain secrecy.
The owner’s failure to treat the information as confidential was
83
fatal to its claim of a confidential relationship. A confidentiality
agreement with only vague secrecy language could not create this
duty unless employees were put on notice that the specific
84
information was secret and the employer treated it as such.
The Electro-Craft decision set the standard for subsequent
Minnesota trade secret cases with respect to interpreting the
MUTSA and determining whether information rises to the level of
85
a trade secret.
III. EMPLOYER VICARIOUS LIABILITY
A. Introduction
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, “[i]n tort, masters are held
answerable for conduct on the part of their servants, which they not
86
only have not authorized, but have forbidden.” The Restatement
of Agency states, and the United States Supreme Court has
confirmed, that a “master is subject to liability for the torts of his
servants committed while acting in the scope of their
87
employment.” The general idea is that the employer should bear
88
“the normal risks of doing business.” Under the respondeat
80. Id. at 903.
81. M INN. STAT. § 325C.01 subd. 3 (2001).
82. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 903
(Minn. 1983).
83. Id. at 901-03.
84. Id. at 903.
85. See Strategic Directions Group, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 293 F.3d
1062, 1064 (8th Cir. 2002) (applying Electro-Craft thee-part trade secret definition);
Widmark v. Northrup King Co., 530 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995)(applying the same formula).
86. Holmes, supra note 24, at 348. The fact that the employer took steps to
forbid certain conduct may actually result in a higher likelihood that the employer
will be held liable for such conduct. See Doe v. United States, 912 F. Supp. 193,
194 (E.D. Va. 1995) (acknowledging that tortious conduct is foreseeable if the
employer has policies prohibiting such conduct).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793 (1998).
88. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 776 (observing that proper inquiry was whether
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superior doctrine, the employer “stands in the shoes” of its
employees as long as the conduct in question falls within the limits
89
of the “scope of employment.”
However, the scope of employment has been defined broadly
enough to hold employers vicariously liable for intentional torts
that were in no sense motivated by any purpose to serve the
90
employer. In the often-cited case of Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v.
United States, for example, the Second Circuit charged the
Government with vicarious liability for the destruction caused by a
sailor who returned to his ship from shore leave after a night of
drinking, and in a drunken stupor, inexplicably opened valves that
controlled water flow into the dry-dock where the ship was
91
docked. The resulting flood caused the ship to tilt, slide off its
blocks and fall against the wall, partially sinking both the ship and
92
the dry-dock. The Government argued that it should not be held
liable to the dry-dock owner because the sailor’s actions were not
93
within the scope of his employment. The Government relied on

sexual harassment was one of the normal risks of doing business and rejecting
mechanical application of Restatement factors).
89. Davis, supra note 19, at 689-90.
90. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 795-96.
Other examples of an expansive sense of scope of employment are
readily found, see, e.g., Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y.
470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920) (opinion of Cardozo, J.) (employer was
liable under worker’s compensation statute for eye injury sustained
when employee threw an apple at another; the accident arose “in the
course of employment” because such horseplay should be expected);
Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946)
(employer liable for actions of carpenter who attacked a co-employee
with a hammer). Courts, in fact, have treated scope of employment
generously enough to include sexual assaults. See, e.g., Primeaux v.
United States, 102 F.3d 1458, 1462-63 (CA8 1996) (federal police
officer on limited duty sexually assaulted stranded motorist); Mary M.
v. Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 216-21, 814 P.2d 1341, 1349-52 (1991)
(en banc) (police officer raped motorist after placing her under
arrest); Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 348-49 (Alaska
1990) (therapist had sexual relations with patient); Turner v. State, 494
So. 2d 1291, 1296 (La. App. 1986) (National Guard recruiting officer
committed sexual battery during sham physical examinations); Lyon v.
Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 655 (CADC 1976) (furniture deliveryman raped
recipient of furniture); Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 594 So.
2d 571, 574 (La. App. 1992) (nursing assistant raped patient).
Id.
91. 398 F.2d 167, 168 (1968).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 170.
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the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 228(1) test for scope
of employment, which requires that the employee’s actions are
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to further the employer’s
94
purposes. Judge Friendly acknowledged that the sailor’s conduct
was not remotely motivated by a purpose to serve his employer.
However, Friendly rejected the motive test and instead relied on
the “deeply rooted sentiment that a business enterprise cannot
justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said
to be characteristic of its activities.” He thus imposed vicarious
liability on the ground that the sailor’s conduct “was not so
‘unforeseeable’ as to make it unfair to charge the Government with
95
responsibility.”
B. Rationales for Holding the Faultless Employer Liable for the
Misdeeds of its Employees
Since the Industrial Revolution and the shift in relationships
between employers and employees, several rationales for the
concept of employer vicarious liability have been advanced,
producing erratic and inconsistent results.
Several scholars have provided thorough analyses of the
development of vicarious liability and the various attempts to
provide justifications from early English and American law through
96
current day. This article will not address these rationales in detail,
but it is worth noting that many leading American analysts have
expressed doubts about vicarious liability. Professor Thomas Baty,
often quoted in vicarious liability analyses, reviewed the various
rationales in 1916 and found them deficient and not based on
precedent, concluding that vicarious liability can only be explained
as a “deep pockets” practice, causing some to note that Baty
97
concluded that the doctrine is perverse.
Oliver Wendell Holmes was “explicit in rejecting the victim’s
need for compensation as an adequate reason for vicarious
98
liability.” Holmes generally supported strict liability when the
defendant did know or could have foreseen the risks, but he
94. Id.
95. Id. at 171.
96. See, generally, Hirschfeld, supra note 26; Schwartz, supra note 27.
97. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1747 (citing Thomas Baty, VICARIOUS LIABILITY
146-54 (1916)); see also Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 788 n.109.
98. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1748 n.50 (citing Holmes, supra note 24, at
357).
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argued vigorously against liability when the defendant’s conduct
turned out to create unforeseeable risks:
Holmes remained hostile to most employer vicarious
liability. According to Holmes, the doctrine marked a
triumph of logic over common sense. Common sense, in
his view, is “opposed to making one man pay for another
man’s wrong.” The “logic” that Holmes had in mind was a
perverse logic: the law’s eagerness to take to a logical
extreme a legal fiction—drawn from
history—that equates
99
the employer and the employee.
Rationales in the vein of “liability without fault makes it
unnecessary to prove negligence, an often difficult task” and
“principals benefit from agents’ wrongful acts, even in cases where
100
neither the principal nor society know it” seem untenable today.
The current rationales fall into two primary categories: fairness
justifications and economic justifications. Some popular fairness
rationales are:
(1) Employer should, in fairness, bear the resulting costs
101
of doing business.
(2) An unjust result would occur if an employer were
allowed to gain from the honest and intelligent acts of
its employees and yet not be responsible for the
wrongful acts of
those under its employ, direction and
102
for its benefit.
(3) Employer should, in fairness, bear the resulting costs
of misconduct that arose from or was in103some way
related to the employee’s essential duties.
(4) Employer should, in fairness, bear the resulting costs

99. Id. at 1747-48 (citing Holmes, supra note 24, at 345-46 and Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Agency, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1891)).
100. Hirschfeld, supra note 26, at 789 (summarizing Professor Seavey’s
defenses for expansion of respondeat superior doctrine and citing Seavey, supra
note 29, at 147, 149).
101. Petro-Tech, Inc. v. W. Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 n.10 (3d Cir.
1987).
102. See id. at 1358 (explaining rationale for employer vicarious liability).
103. See, e.g., Samuels v. S. Baptist Hosp., 594 So. 2d 571, 574 (La. Ct. App.
1992) (stating tortious conduct was “reasonably incidental” to the performance of
the nursing assistant’s duties in caring for a “helpless” patient in a “locked
environment”). This doctrine is based in a “deeply rooted sentiment that a
business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may
fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities.” Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. U.S.,
398 F.2d 167, 171 (2nd Cir. 1968).
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104

of its employee’s acts that were foreseeable.
Popular economic rationales include:
(1) Self-regulation is more efficient than government
105
regulation, at least during the time of service. The
master can control the activities of the servant, and
the natural conclusion is that responsibility
for the
106
harm should rest with the party in control.
(2) The employer should have a financial incentive to
107
control the servant and to maintain close watch.
Related to this is the concept that vicarious liability
promotes better hiring and oversight by employers
and gives employers strong incentives
to shrewdly
108
select and supervise employees.
(3) The public policy of risk sharing—corporations are
deep pockets, providing another source from which a
109
damaged party may recover damages. An injured
plaintiff might
not recover if only the employee was
110
held liable.
111
(4) General distrust of corporate power.
104. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 398 F.2d at 171-72.
105. Davis, supra note 19, at 688 (citing Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A.
Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A Second Look at
Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1574 (1990)).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958).
It is true that normally one in control of tangible things is not liable
without fault. But in the law of master and servant the use of the
fiction that “the act of the servant is the act of the master” has made it
seem fair to subject the non-faulty employer to liability for the
negligent and other faulty conduct of his servants.
Id.
107. See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785
(1973).
108. See id. (observing that “[K]nowing that he is responsible, [employer] will
be alert to prevent the occurrence of such injuries.”); Schwartz, supra note 27, at
1758.
109. See Lange, 297 Minn. at 403, 211 N.W.2d at 785 (stating risk-sharing
justification for respondeat superior: Employer can and should ensure against
such contingencies, or “by adjusting his prices so that his patrons must bear part, if
not all, of the burden of insurance. In this way, losses are spread and the shock of
the accident is dispersed.”); Davis, supra note 19, at 688; Bradley J. Haight, Civil
RICO Section 1962(c): Vicarious Liability and Arguments for Expanding its Scope and
Elements, CIV. RICO LITIG. REP. (May 1999), at 11.
110. See Lange, 297 Minn. at 403, 211 N.W.2d at 785; Davis, supra note 19, at
688; Haight, supra note 109, at 11.
111. Davis, supra note 19, at 688 (citing Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 105,
at 1574).
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(5) A desire to enforce corporate responsibility.
As a result of these considerations, the courts of today have
developed tests to provide guidance in predicting whether such a
relation between the parties exists such that liability will be
imposed upon the employer for the employee’s conduct that is in
113
the scope of employment.
Regardless of the rationales, the
courts now agree that the conduct must be within the “scope of
employment”; however, many of the courts have created legal
fictions in order to shoehorn into this definition misconduct that
significantly deviates from authorized duties.
C. Scope of Employment Test
The Restatement (Second) of Agency reflects the traditional
test to determine whether an employee’s conduct falls within the
“scope of employment”:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of
employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time
and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against
another, the use of force is not unexpectable by
the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of
employment if it is different in kind from that
authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space
limits, or
too little actuated by a purpose to serve the
114
master.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency at section 219 also offers
ten factors to be considered in deciding whether an employee’s
115
conduct has occurred within the scope of employment.

112. Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach. Co., Inc., 355 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (noting “[i]f we allow the master to be careless of his servants’ torts we
lose hold upon the most valuable check in the conduct of social life”) (citing
Laski, supra note 29, at 114).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958).
114. Id. § 228.
115. Id. § 229(2).
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The United States federal and state courts, however, have
diverged on which agency principles to apply and how to apply
them. The recent trend has been to expand the situations when an
employer is liable while relaxing the requirements that the
employee’s acts be motivated by a purpose to serve or benefit the
116
employer. As stated above, many courts have defined scope of
employment so broadly to include intentional torts that were in no
sense motivated by any purpose to serve the employer. Minnesota
has generally followed this trend, rejecting any notion that the
employee’s motivation for his conduct is relevant to the inquiry;
but in recent years, Minnesota courts have started requiring proof
of some element of foreseeability of the misconduct by the
employer. In this legal landscape, the presence or absence of
expert testimony as to “foreseeability” often determines the
outcome of the case.
D. Minnesota Case Law—the Importance of Foreseeability and Expert
Testimony
1. Pre-Lange Landscape
Prior to 1973, Minnesota courts generally followed the
Restatement of Agency in determining the “scope of employment”
and imposed liability where the plaintiff demonstrated that the
employee’s acts were motivated by a desire to further the
117
employee’s business.
For example, in Kasner v. Gage the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether to hold a magazine
sales company liable for its sales agent’s misappropriation of a
competitor’s business records despite the fact that the company did
118
not know of the unlawful acts or ratify them. The court stated
that an employer cannot be liable for the tortious or criminal acts
116. Domar Ocean Transp. v. Indep. Ref. Co., 783 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir.
1986) (finding that “an act may be within the scope of employment although
consciously criminal or tortious.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
231(1958)); Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1351 (4th Cir. 1995)
(stating that even “forbidden” or “consciously criminal or tortious” acts may still be
within scope of employment).
117. Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 401, 211 N.W.2d 783, 784
(1973).
118. 281 Minn. 149, 150, 161 N.W.2d 40, 41 (1968). In this case, the sales
agent was a franchised dealer, rather than an employee, but in light of the nature
of the relationship, the dealer was an “agent,” and the same vicarious liability
principles applied. Id. at 152 n.4, 161 N.W.2d at 42.
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of an employee without a supported finding that the act “is
‘conduct . . . of the same general nature as that authorized, or
119
incidental to the conduct authorized.’” The Kasner court then
proceeded to consider the various factors set forth in section
120
229(2) of Restatement (Second) of Agency and a comment in the
Restatement section 248:
A master who authorizes a servant to compete with others
and to do such acts as appear to the servant to be
reasonably necessary in order to make such competition
effective is subject to liability to persons injured by
tortious acts committed in the course of such competition
if intended for the benefit of the principal or master and
if not an extraordinary or121 outrageous method of
conducting such competition.
The Kasner court held, as a matter of law, that the sales agent’s
conduct in misappropriating competitor’s records was not within
the scope of any employment or agency relationship with his
122
company.
The court explained that despite the highly
competitive nature of the periodical business, there was no
evidence that one of the methods of competition in that business
123
In
contemplated theft of competitors’ business records.
declining to impose liability on the master, the court concluded
that the agent’s theft of records was not the result of any
instruction or instrumentality furnished by the company and was
“plainly a departure from the normal methods authorized for the
124
accomplishment of its business objectives.”
2. The Lange Scope of Employment Test
In 1973, in Lange v. National Biscuit Co., a case involving the
assault of a grocery store manager by a cookie salesman, the
Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged the “majority rule” at the
time for determining “scope of employment” involved an inquiry
into: (a) whether conduct was motivated by business or personal
considerations; or (b) whether the conduct was contemplated by

119. Id. at 151-52, 161 N.W.2d at 42 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
AGENCY § 229 (1958)).
120. Id. at 152, 161 N.W.2d at 42.
121. Id. at 152-153, 161 N.W.2d at 43.
122. Id. at 153, 161 N.W.2d at 43.
123. Id. at 154, 161 N.W.2d at 44.
124. Id. at 156, 161 N.W.2d at 44.
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125

the employer or incident to employment. However, the court
rejected the notion that the employee’s motivation, that is, whether
or not in engaging in the misconduct the employee was motivated
to further the employer’s business, should be a consideration and
126
abandoned the motivation test.
The Lange court discussed several rationales for imposing
vicarious liability on an employer that is not at fault. One
justification is that the employer, knowing that it will now be liable
for all torts of its servants, can obtain insurance to cover such
liabilities or pass along the cost to its customers in the form of
127
higher prices,
thus spreading the liability caused by the
wrongdoer among numerous innocent third parties. The court
also reasoned that the employer, knowing the expanse of his
potential liability, would take action to prevent such occurrences in
128
the future.
The Lange court formulated the following two-prong test for
employer vicarious liability for the intentional torts of its
employees, a test still followed today:
(1) the source of the conduct is related to the duties of
the employee; and
(2) the conduct occurs with work-related limits of time
129
and place.
The second prong, work-related time and place, was satisfied
in Lange. The court determined that, as a matter of law, the assault
was related to the salesman’s work duties because the “precipitating
cause of the initial argument concerned the employee’s conduct of
his work. In addition, the employee originally was motivated to
become argumentative in furtherance of his employer’s
130
business.” The court noted that whether the argument at some
point becomes personal and not related to the scope of
131
employment was not pertinent.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
Kasner,
ruling.
130.
131.

297 Minn. 399, 401, 211 N.W.2d 783, 784 (1973).
Id. at 402, 211 N.W.2d at 784.
Id. at 403, 211 N.W.2d at 785.
Id.
Id. at 404, 211 N.W.2d at 786. Although Lange did not expressly overrule
it overruled former decisions to the extent they were inconsistent with its
Id. at 405, 211 N.W.2d at 786.
Id. at 404, 211 N.W.2d at 786.
Id. at 404, 211 N.W.2d at 785-76.
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3. Development of the Foreseeability Requirement
After Lange, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered three
employer vicarious liability cases, all involving sexual misconduct by
the employee from which it developed the requirement that
misconduct must at least be “foreseeable” in order to satisfy the first
132
prong of the Lange scope of employment test.
An accepted
method of proving foreseeability was expert testimony that the
133
tortious conduct at issue was a “well-known [industry] hazard.”
In these cases, the decision often turned on whether the plaintiff
134
had offered expert testimony on this issue.
In Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the liability of a clinic for
damages caused by an employee-psychologist who made
unwelcome and improper sexual advances to patients during and
135
immediately after therapy. In cases brought by two patients and
tried separately, the juries found that the clinic was not vicariously
136
liable for the employee’s actions.
The court noted that the
doctor “intentionally departed from the standards of his profession,
not . . . to cause harm . . . but rather to confer a personal benefit on
137
himself.” Although the doctor’s conduct was entirely for his own
benefit, a sharp departure from his normal duties, absolutely
forbidden, totally unethical and of no therapeutic purpose, the
court found persuasive testimony that sexual relations between a
psychologist and a patient was “a well-known hazard and thus, to a
138
degree, foreseeable and a risk of employment.” The court
concluded that it should be a question of fact whether the
psychologist’s acts were “foreseeable, related to and connected with
139
acts otherwise within the scope of employment.”
In P.L. v. Aubert, the Minnesota Supreme Court assessed a

132. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 911 (Minn. 1999); P.L. v.
Aubert, 545 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. 1996); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of
Psychiatry and Neurology, 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1982).
133. Fahrendorff, 597 N.W.2d at 911; Aubert, 545 N.W.2d at 668; Marston, 329
N.W.2d at 311.
134. Fahrendorff, 597 N.W.2d at 911, Aubert, 545 N.W.2d at 668; Marston, 329
N.W.2d at 311.
135. 329 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Minn. 1982).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 310.
138. Id. at 311.
139. Id. The court reversed and remanded for new trials based on an error in
the jury instructions. Id. at 311-12.
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school district’s liability for the misconduct of a teacher who
engaged in sexual contact with a minor student, including sexual
140
relations on the school premises and, at times, during class hours.
The court invoked the Lange two-prong scope of employment test,
but distinguished the case from Marston based on the plaintiff’s
failure to provide an affidavit or other evidence showing
foreseeability:
Here we find no evidence that such relationships between
teacher and student are a “well-known hazard”; thus
foreseeability is absent. While it is true that teachers have
power and authority over students, no expert testimony or
affidavits were presented regarding the potential for abuse
of such power in these
situations; thus there can be no
141
implied foreseeability.
The Aubert court also concluded that the teacher’s actions with
142
the student were unrelated to her duties as a teacher, but
provided little explanation of the basis for its determination. The
court indicated that the first prong of the Lange test now required
proof of relationship of the misconduct to the duties of the
143
employee and foreseeability. Interestingly, the Aubert court also
found relevant the facts that the school district never observed the
misconduct, took reasonable measures of supervision, and
144
adequately considered the safety and welfare of students.
Although these factors may be relevant to a negligent supervision
claim, they form no part of the Lange test for vicarious liability.
Next, in Fahrendorff v. North Homes, Inc., the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered a case in which a group home
145
counselor sexually assaulted a minor resident of the home.
Taking a lesson from Marston and Aubert, the plaintiff in Fahrendorff
duly provided expert testimony that “inappropriate sexual contact
or abuse of power in these situations, although infrequent, is a well

140. 545 N.W.2d 666, 666 (Minn. 1996).
141. Id. at 668. The Minnesota Supreme Court subsequently noted that since
its decision in Aubert, the United States Supreme Court stated in a Title IX case
that “[t]he number of reported cases involving sexual harassment of students in
schools confirms that harassment unfortunately is an all too common aspect of the
educational experience.” Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 911 n.1
(Minn. 1999) (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998)).
142. Aubert, 545 N.W.2d at 668.
143. Id. at 667-68.
144. Id. at 668.
145. 597 N.W.2d 905, 905 (Minn. 1999).
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146

known hazard in this field.”
The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the group home, and the court of appeals
affirmed, based on their determinations that (1) like the teacher in
Aubert, the counselor was acting for his own gratification and
therefore his conduct fell outside the scope of his employment,
and (2) the affidavit was insufficient because it did not contain
information specific to the counselor and did not conclude that
147
this specific conduct by the counselor was foreseeable.
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed.
First, the
Fahrendorff court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that
the counselor’s sexual contact with the plaintiff was related to his
employment duties, citing Marston for the proposition that an
employee’s actions may still be within the scope of employment
even though motivated by personal gratification and prohibited by
148
the employer.
The court did not distinguish, however, the
counselor’s conduct from the teacher’s conduct in Aubert. Second,
the court found that even though the expert affidavit was somewhat
conclusory and lacked specific examples, it was exactly what the
court relied on in Marston and what was lacking in Aubert.;
therefore it was sufficient to show foreseeability, at least enough to
149
raise a question of fact to be determined by a jury.
The Fahrendorff court also took the opportunity to clarify that
the standard for “foreseeability” in vicarious liability cases is
150
different than the standard used in negligence cases.
In the
negligence context, “foreseeable” means “a level of probability
which would lead a prudent person to take effective precautions”,
whereas in the vicarious liability test, “foreseeability” merely means
that “in the context of the particular enterprise an employee’s
conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to
include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the
151
employer’s business.”
IV. HAGEN V. BURMEISTER & ASSOCIATES, INC.—EMPLOYER VICARIOUS
LIABILITY FOR MISAPPROPTIATION OF TRADE SECRETS
Against this background, the Minnesota Supreme Court
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 909.
Id.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 911-12.
Id. at 912.
Id.
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approached these two issues, trade secrets and vicarious liability, in
152
Hagen v. Burmeister & Associates, Inc.
In Hagen, an employer
sought review of the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision that the
employer was vicariously liable for its employee’s theft of his former
employer’s trade secrets, either on the theory of breach of contract
153
or the tort of misappropriation of trade secret. The Minnesota
Supreme Court (1) rejected the notion that vicarious liability is
154
available for breach of contract; (2) determined that the MUTSA
and breach of contract theories of recovery are not mutually
exclusive—an employer may still be vicariously liable for the
intentional tort of trade secret theft even if the same conduct also
constitutes breach of contract, for which the employer cannot be
155
vicariously liable; (3) confirmed that the proper test for vicarious
liability is the Lange scope-of-employment test, with an emphasis on
156
foreseeability of the misconduct; (4) pointedly declined to
address the court of appeals’ conclusion that vicarious liability for
violation of the MUTSA was possible and emphasized that its
assumption that there is no legal prohibition to this proposition
157
applied only to the Hagen case;
and (5) assuming this
proposition, held that the plaintiff’s failure to introduce evidence
of either actual knowledge or foreseeability of the misconduct was
fatal to its respondeat superior claim and reversed the court of
158
appeals.
In Hagen, the plaintiff, insurance agency Burmeister &
Associates, Inc. (“Burmeister”) purchased the assets of the Hagen
Agency, Inc., which was owned by insurance agent Paul Hagen
(“Hagen”). At the same time it hired Hagen, first as a consultant
159
and later as an employee.
Hagen signed a confidentiality
agreement and a non-compete agreement, in which Hagen agreed
not to disclose Burmeister’s policyholder information and not to
sell or issue property or casualty insurance to Burmeister customers
160
for a period of about ten years.
Hagen subsequently resigned from Burmeister and went to
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

633 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Minn. 2001).
Id. at 499.
Id. at 503.
Id.
Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 499-500.
Id. at 500.
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161

work for a competitor, American Agency, Inc. (“American”).
Burmeister reiterated its intent to enforce its rights with respect to
its clients but stated that Hagen’s close friends and family
members, representing about fifty people, could keep their
162
business with Hagen. Burmeister informed American of his noncompete and confidentiality agreements with Burmeister and
provided some description of the exceptions Burmeister allowed.
American understood that Hagen “had a good exit interview and
163
that he was free to solicit some of the accounts . . . .”
Hagen took customer information for about 1,000 Burmeister
accounts and proceeded to send a solicitation letter on American
stationary to 250 Burmeister accounts, representing about twenty to
thirty percent of the accounts Hagen originally sold to
164
Burmeister. American was aware that Burmeister was sending out
a letter, but was not aware of the number of letters sent or the
165
recipients.
Burmeister complained to Hagen, prompting an
action by Hagen seeking a declaratory judgment that Hagen could
166
compete with Burmeister. At this point, American learned about
the controversy, contacted Burmeister, and agreed not to accept
business from the customers at issue until the parties could meet to
167
discuss the issue.
The parties then met and agreed to a joint
letter to the customers at issue, stating that the customers “have a
168
right to select the insurance agent of their choice.” American
believed the parties’ decision satisfactorily resolved the dispute and
allowed Hagen to proceed with transferring business from some of
169
Burmeister, on the other hand,
the customers at issue.
apparently viewed the letter as merely damage control while it
170
pursued its legal remedies.
Burmeister asserted counterclaims against Hagen, including
breach of contract, unjust enrichment and misappropriation of
171
trade secrets.
Burmeister subsequently filed a third-party
complaint against American for tortious interference with contract,
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 500-01.
Id. at 501.
Id.
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172

which evolved into a respondeat superior claim. American did
not challenge Burmeister’s change in recovery theories, so the
173
court treated the respondeat superior claim as if it were pled.
The trial court found Hagen liable for breach of contract and
trade secret misappropriation as defined by the MUTSA. However,
it held as a matter of law that American was not vicariously liable
for Hagen’s actions, reasoning that: (1) the MUTSA does not
permit recovery against an employer when its employees
misappropriate trade secrets; (2) the applicability of common law
respondeat superior tort theory to trade secret misappropriation
was not supported by law; and (3) even if respondeat superior were
applicable, the claim failed because American “did not know, and
174
had no reason to know” that Hagen’s conduct was not permitted.
Burmeister appealed the trial court’s holding. In Hagen I, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with respect to
the breach of contract claim, reasoning that the doctrine of
respondeat superior applies only to tortious conduct committed by
an employee, not to an employee’s breach of contract in the
175
absence of independent tortious conduct by the employer.
However, the court of appeals reversed with respect to the claim for
vicarious liability for trade secret misappropriation, holding that an
employer can be held liable for an employee’s tort of trade secret
176
misappropriation. The court of appeals held that the common
law remedy of vicarious liability for intentional torts should be
applied to the misappropriation of trade secrets, as with any other
177
The apellate court explained that although the MUTSA
tort.
does not specifically provide for recovery against an employer for
its employee’s violation of the MUTSA, the MUTSA remedies are
not exclusive, and the MUTSA does not preclude common law
178
vicarious liability claims. The court of appeals remanded the case
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing M INN. R. CIV. P. 15.02 and T.W. Sommer Co. v. Modern Door &
Lumber Co., 293 Minn. 264, 269, 198 N.W.2d 278, 281 (1972)).
174. Id. at 501.
175. Hagen v. Burmeister & Assoc. Inc., No. C8-98-864, 1999 WL 31130, *2-3
(Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1999).
176. Id. at *4.
177. Id. Neither party sought review of the court of appeals’ decision to apply
the respondeat superior doctrine to trade secret misappropriation. Id.
178. Id. at *3 (noting that MUTSA displaces only conflicting remedies). The
MUTSA provides that it “displace[s] conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of
this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of trade secret.” M INN.
STAT. § 325C.07(a) (2001) (emphasis added).
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for further findings as to whether Hagen’s conduct fell within the
scope of his employment with American, thus rendering American
179
vicariously liable for Hagen’s actions.
On remand, American argued that Hagen’s conduct fell
outside the scope of his employment because it was not reasonably
180
foreseeable that Hagen would misappropriate trade secrets. The
trial court agreed and granted summary judgment for American,
explaining that American did not authorize or ratify Hagen’s
actions and no evidence demonstrated that the misappropriation
181
of trade secrets is a well-known industry hazard.
In Hagen II, the court of appeals again reversed, holding that
Hagen was, in fact, acting within the scope of his employment when
182
he misappropriated Burmeister’s trade secrets.
The court of
appeals stated that there are two vicarious liability tests, one
183
established in Kasner and the other in Lange. According to the
court of appeals, the Kasner test applied to situations where the
current employer authorized competition by the employee and the
competition simply went too far, whereas the Lange test applied to
184
other situations. The court of appeals determined that Hagen
was acting within the scope of his employment and that American
was vicariously liable for the improper solicitations because
American authorized the plan to make proper solicitations and
185
assisted with that plan. American appealed that decision.
As a preliminary matter, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld
the court of appeals’ decision in Hagen I that vicarious liability is
not available for breach of contract claims but rejected American’s
claim that vicarious liability for tortious trade secret
misappropriation is not available where the underlying conduct is a
186
breach of contract. The supreme court noted that American did
not appeal the court of appeals’ decision to extend the doctrine of
respondeat superior to trade secret misappropriation and, as a

179. Hagen, No. C8-98-864, 1999 WL 31130, at *4.
180. Hagen v. Burmeister & Assoc., Inc., 633 N.W.2d 497, 502 (Minn. 2001).
181. Id.
182. Hagen v. Am. Agency, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 799, 804-05 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000).
183. Id. at 802.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 804.
186. Hagen v. Burmeister & Assoc. Inc., 633 N.W.2d 497, 500, 503 (Minn.
2001) (noting that American abandoned issue of whether client list was a “trade
secret” as defined by MUTSA).
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187

result, that legal conclusion was not at issue. The supreme court
declined to affirm this decision and pointed out throughout the
opinion that it was only assuming for the limited purposes of the
Hagen decision that vicarious liability could apply to an employee’s
188
MUTSA violation.
The Hagen court then proceeded with its analysis of the
respondeat superior doctrine and its application to the claim at
issue. The court stated that the scope-of-employment test as
clarified in Lange was the proper test, rather than the earlier test
enunciated in Kasner, which the district court and court of appeals
189
applied. The proper test for employer liability for an employee’s
intentional tortious act involves a determination of (1) whether the
tort was related to the employee’s duties; and (2) whether the tort
190
occured within work-related limits of time and place. Hagen’s
conduct clearly occurred within work-related time and place; the
only question was whether his conduct was related to his duties as
an American employee.
The court followed the Fahrendorff court’s consideration of
whether the employee’s acts were “foreseeable, related to, and
connected with the acts otherwise within the scope of his
191
employment.”
The court also relied on the recent line of
Minnesota cases emphasizing the importance of the foreseeability
factor in determining whether the first prong of the scope-of192
employment test is satisfied.
The court stated that proof of
foreseeability is crucial in order to satisfy the scope-of-employment
test and explained that proof can be established in a number of
ways, including showing that the type of tortious conduct involved
193
is a well-known industry standard. The court held that in the case
at issue, Burmeister failed to prove or even raise a question of fact
with respect to the foreseeability issue, which was fatal to its
194
respondeat superior claim. According to the court, American did
not know or have reason to know that Hagen did not make
appropriate arrangements with Burmeister regarding the letters to
customers, and Burmeister failed to introduce any other evidence
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 503.
Id. at 503, 504.
Id. at 504.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 504-05.
Id. at 505.
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of foreseeability, such as evidence demonstrating that the risk of
employees misappropriating trade secrets is a well-known hazard in
195
the insurance industry.
It is clear that if Burmeister had introduced some expert
testimony of misappropriation being a common hazard of the
industry or some other showing of foreseeability, its claim may have
survived.
V. MINNESOTA POST-HAGEN CASES
The Minnesota Court of Appeals applied Hagen in two
subsequent cases. In Wilson v. Stock Lumber, Inc., the plaintiff
claimed a lumber company was vicariously liable for its driver’s
196
“road rage” assault on the plaintiff.
The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment for
the employer based on the plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence
that the employee “could be expected to engage in assaultive
conduct or that road rage is a well-known hazard in the delivery
197
business.”
In Boykin v. Perkins Family Restaurant, the court considered a
restaurant’s liability for an employee’s sexual harassment and
198
battery of another employee on the job. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the employer, concluding that the
employee’s misconduct was not foreseeable by the employer or
otherwise related to or connected with acts within the scope of his
199
200
employment. The court of appeals reversed. The court did not
require expert testimony and instead determined that the fact that
the employer had policies prohibiting sexual harassment,
conducted sexual harassment training and posted a “no-touch”
policy at the restaurant were all evidence of foreseeability of the
201
employee’s misconduct.
According to the Boykin court’s reasoning, all activities
expressly prohibited by an employer, by definition, satisfy the
“foreseeability” requirement because the employer must have
anticipated the conduct in order to prohibit it.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
No. C3-01-623, 2001 WL 1182796, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2001).
Id. at *14.
No. C9-01-1100, 2002 WL 4548, *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2002).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *4.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The continued expansion of vicarious liability theories has
created a legal landscape in which employers are almost always
held liable for their employees’ actions, no matter how outrageous,
deliberate, or insubordinate they are, unless the plaintiff fails to
present an expert at trial.
The current policy imposes “foreseeability,” and therefore
liability in most cases, even where the employer has acted
responsibly and forbidden the misconduct. One rationale for
vicarious liability is to make employers more responsible. Yet a
policy of endless liability discourages employers from acting
responsibly because taking precautions does not prevent liability,
and as the Boykin decision illustrates, could actually increase it.
Fairness is also ill-served. The employer that has no knowledge
of or involvement in the misconduct and has taken every
precaution to prevent it may still be held liable for an employee’s
gross misconduct outside the scope of the employer’s business.
The rationale that other select innocent parties who are unlucky
enough to do business with either the employer, the employer’s
insurers, or the employer’s customers, can help defray the costs
also does not serve the goal of fairness.
In the context of trade secret theft by employees, the
seemingly limitless expansion is especially frightening. Holding a
cookie company responsible for its salesman’s quarrel with a grocer
seems relatively harmless. However, in an era of multi-million
dollar trade-secret theft claims against employees by their former
employers, an expanded vicarious liability policy could easily
destroy an employer, resulting in harm to shareholders, as well as
loss of jobs, innovation, and productivity.
The original
justifications for vicarious liability, fairness and economic goals, are
not served by such unjust and economically disastrous
consequences.
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